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THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 2, Number 8 (May 7, 1997) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
New edict on presidential chancellery  
On April 9, President Yel'tsin issued a new statute on the structure and duties of 
his Chancellery, which appears to complete the process of incorporating the 
once-independent position of First Adviser into the general presidential staff 
organization. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 17 Apr 97) According to the edict, the 
Chancellery is an "autonomous subdivision" of the president's staff with the right 
to establish its own administrations and departments as needed. The head of the 
Chancellery will have the status of deputy chief of staff and is appointed by the 
president upon the nomination of the chief of staff. Although the edict does not 
stipulate who will head the new Chancellery, the most likely candidate is First 
Deputy Chief of Staff Yuri Yarov, who coordinated the flow of paperwork to and 
from the president during his convalescence from heart surgery. 
 
The primary task of the Chancellery is "to provide documentation services for the 
activity of the Russian Federation President." While this role puts the Chancellery 
at the heart of the decree writing and promulgation process, it does not appear to 
clarify the procedure for the instigation of decrees: In drafting presidential 
instructions, the Chancellery is to coordinate with "the leadership of the Russian 
Federation Presidential Staff and the Russian Federation president's aides, 
advisers, and consultants and the relevant autonomous subdivisions." While the 
head of the Chancellery is instructed to submit any draft statutes on the 
Chancellery or its subdivisions to the chief of staff for approval before they are 
confirmed by presidential edict, no mention is made of draft decrees on other 
issues. It remains unclear therefore, if the procedure established by Chubais, 
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whereby all decrees are reviewed by the chief of staff before sent to the 
president, remains in effect. 
 
RF PRESIDENT 
SECURITY SERVICES 
Post-Korzhakov guard reforms?  
Obshchaya gazeta (No. 15, 17-23 Apr 97) attempts to examine the status of the 
Presidential Security Service, which became a subdivision of the Federal 
Protective Service (FSO) following the ouster of Aleksandr Korzhakov. While 
details on the Services, under the direction of Anatoli Kuznetsov and Yuri 
Krapivin, are admittedly "scanty," we do learn that 120 people have been 
dismissed for "political reasons." (This number would include the President's 
"astrologer," General Rogozin.) Any significant new recruits to the service are 
scrutinized by Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff (for personnel) Yevgeni 
Savostyanov. Savostyanov was previously head of the Moscow Federal Security 
Service Administration until a much-publicized run-in with Korzhakov's guards 
outside of the MOST Group headquarters. 
 
As for the structure of the Presidential Security Service, there are currently five 
divisions led by adjutants: three are assigned to the president, two guard his wife. 
Despite changes in personnel and structure however, Obshchaya gazeta points 
out that there has been no diminution in the scope of authority of the Federal 
Protective Service, which can still conduct surveillances, wiretaps, and other 
intelligence-gathering functions. With these powers still intact, the FSO continues 
the duplication of security responsibilities with the MVD, FSB, FAPSI and 
Procuracy—all of which persist in a struggle for supremacy along various fronts 
within the intelligence and security services array. 
 
RF GOVERNMENT 
Nemtsov's memoirs barely scandalous  
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The publication of excerpts from First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtzov's 
memoirs, "The Provincial," reveal mainly positive impressions of leading political 
and cultural figures. (Obshchaya gazeta, No 14, 10-16 Apr 97) While Nemtsov 
does call President Yel'tsin "a veritable Russian tsar," he qualifies it by adding 
that he is a "good" tsar. The description of Yel'tsin's behavior during the August 
1991 coup provides a fit characterization for his entire rule: "he would issue 
commands, insufficiently considered, at times, as to who should do what, then 
sink into a kind of melancholy, then come round once again and begin to direct 
the defenses." Likewise his depiction of the relationship between Yel'tsin and 
Korzhakov proves acute: "Korzhakov, who was constantly by Yel'tsin's side, was 
not chief of security. He was a 'way of life'." 
 
Nemtsov views his new boss, Chernomyrdin, as more of a "business manager" 
than politician, but he credits him with an openness to new ideas and a strong 
devotion to Yel'tsin. Nemtsov's remarks about his co-first deputy prime minister 
are unlikely to cause any workplace friction either. He finds Chubais "an honest 
and incorruptible person." "Chubais is one of the most gifted politicians of 
Russia." The memoirs likewise hold praise for Gaidar and Nemtsov's "comrade" 
Yavlinsky. Perhaps after his stint in the government a revised version will appear. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger 
 
Talbott's 'pre-prenegotiations' again upstage Albright-Primakov talks... 
Arriving in Moscow ahead of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, deputy 
secretary Strobe Talbott again made concessions prior to the pre-negotiations 
upon which his boss was about to embark. 
 
Talbott and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov were meeting, the 
Russian minister said, to smooth the way to "a full-fledged binding document on 
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Russia-NATO relations (to be) drafted, as far as possible, before May 27," the 
scheduled date of a NATO meeting in Paris. Moscow seeks a presence at the 
Paris talks as evidence of its clout. 
 
"The decisions of the Russian-U.S. Helsinki summit on the non-proliferation of 
the NATO infrastructure and the adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe 
Treaty (CFE) have to be put on a practical footing," a Russian Foreign Ministry 
report quoted Primakov as saying. (Interfax, 30 Apr 97) 
 
... while Clinton foreign policy praised by Russian hard-liners 
Meanwhile, U.S President Bill Clinton was praised by Moscow's hard-left 
newspaper Trud for announcing General Wesley Clark's candidacy for the post of 
NATO supreme allied commander in Europe. Clark, the paper claimed, had 
proved during his work on the (now-unraveling) Dayton accords for Bosnia that 
he "knows how to view international problems not only from a purely military 
perspective." Clark's candidacy showed that Clinton would take Russian 
concerns about NATO expansion seriously and that among American foreign 
policy elites "the President is currently a counterbalance to those forces which 
want to write Russia off as a great power and do whatever the United States 
wants in Europe with no regard for Russia's 'impotent growling.' " (Trud, 30 Apr 
97) 
 
We're all multipolarists now 
President of the Russian Federation Boris Yel'tsin and Chairman of the People's 
Republic of China Jiang Zemin on April 23 signed a Joint Russian-Chinese 
Declaration about a "Multipolar World and the Formation of a New International 
Order." 
 
"The Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China" will cooperate "to 
develop relations of equitable and trustful partnership for the purpose of strategic 
interaction in the 21st century," the declaration said. 
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The declaration and comments surrounding Zemin's visit to Moscow were similar 
in spirit to complaints about the West's hegemony that were heard during last 
month's agreement between Russia and Iran. (See ISCIP Editorial Digest: 
Russian Foreign Relations, Volume II, Number 7). 
 
"A diversity of political, economic and cultural development of all countries is 
becoming a norm, the role played by the forces favoring peace and large-scale 
international cooperation is being enhanced," the declaration said. "An ever 
greater number of countries are coming to understand that what they need is 
mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit but not confrontation and conflicts." 
(ITAR-TASS, 23 Apr 97) 
 
Russia woos Slovakia 
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, visiting Bratislava on April 28, 
signed an agreement on military and technical cooperation between Russia and 
the Slovak Republic. The agreement specifies that neither of the parties to the 
agreement will, without a written approval by the other party, sell or pass onto 
other countries arms, military hardware, or technical documentation for their 
manufacture. 
 
The agreement would harm Slovakia's chances to enter NATO by binding the 
republic to Russian arms manufacturers, according to Igor Cibula, once the 
eminence grise behind Slovak premier Vladimir Meciar but now advising the 
opposition Democratic Union. 
 
The Slovak foreign ministry said the agreement was routine and similar to deals 
Moscow had struck with Paris and Berlin. But unlike larger Western nations, 
Cibula said, Slovakia could not afford such close ties. "There is a fundamental 
difference in Germany and France being such strong partners for Russia that 
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agreements of this type do not have such an impact on their arms industry and, 
above all, their exports, as they do on Slovakia," Cibula said. 
 
Jan Langos, leader of the opposition Democratic Party and former Czechoslovak 
Minister of the Interior, said the agreement "makes Slovakia an economic and 
military satellite of the RF." (Sme, 28 Apr 97) 
 
Comment 
The pre-empting Primakov 
Give Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov this much credit—he is no 
snob. A less flexible apparatchik might find it beneath his dignity to start 
negotiations with counterparts beneath him in rank, then work his way up to his 
diplomatic equals and then, finally, foreign heads of state. But Primakov clearly 
finds the "personal chemistry" he enjoys with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott to be the catalyst he needs to erode positions taken at a higher level. 
 
Somewhere between the Helsinki summit and last week's "closed door" meeting 
between Talbott and Primakov, the Russian "voice, but not a veto" over NATO 
expansion has, thanks to Primakov's tenacity, become both a linkage to the 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and a Russia-NATO agreement that will 
likely be "binding." 
 
The Russian Foreign Ministry's tight-lipped report of the meeting did not account 
for why issues on which no formal agreement had been reached now needed a 
"practical footing." Nor did it explain why the United States seemed in such a 
hurry to get Russia to Paris by May 27, given that her attendance was thought to 
be a diplomatic prize to be earned, not hastily packaged and given away. 
 
In an act of remarkable ingratitude, the Russian Foreign Ministry then impugned 
Talbott's reputation by implying that he had a loose tongue. In the closed-door 
meeting, the report said, Talbott "informed (Primakov) about the approaches 
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Washington is thinking of. Russian and U.S. experts were told to consider 
various options." (Interfax, 30 Apr 97) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Political Parties and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
Duma claims that Russian agriculture is in critical condition 
The resolution says that the Nizhniy Novgorod method of agricultural reform, 
which was proposed by the government as a model, is not efficient. An increase 
of industrial prices has resulted in the bankruptcy of over 70 percent of 
agricultural organizations. The gross agricultural production, including meat, 
grain and milk, was halved. Some 18 million hectares of arable lands were 
withdrawn from circulation. More than 50 percent of food is imported. 
 
It must be noted that although the change in Russian agriculture is considerable, 
the effects on the average person are unclear. As private sales fill in the holes of 
the state distribution system, the official numbers become increasingly irrelevant. 
(ITAR-TASS, 21 Mar 97) 
 
Federatsiya newspaper closes 
The proposal by the Russian State Committee for the Press agreed with the 
Russian State Committee for the Management of State Property and the Russian 
Ministry of the Economy to liquidate the state-run newspaper. The State 
Committee for the Management of State Property is to register the transfer of the 
property of the liquidated state enterprise to the balance sheet of the editorial 
board of the journal Rossiyskaya federatsiya. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 18 Mar 97) 
 
The Constitutional Court on the taxation powers of the regions 
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The Russian Constitutional Court recently explained that the Federation's regions 
had no right to invent their own taxes. They are allowed to levy only the taxes 
that are stipulated by the federal legislation. No regional power of taxation exists. 
The decision was in response to the appeals of the Komi Republic, Altay 
Territory, Irkutsk, Volgograd and Vladimir regions, which argued that the Federal 
Assembly's "exhaustive list of taxes, which could be levied by the subjects of the 
Russian Federation on their respective territories" was unconstitutional. 
 
The Constitutional Court noted that the regions could "independently decide" 
whether to put into effect a tax permitted by the Federal Assembly. Moreover, a 
regional tax, the verdict says, means only a detailed version of the general 
federal principles of taxation. 
 
The issue of regional taxation and other sources of local revenue are of extreme 
importance in an era when the central authorities cannot, or will not, provide 
sufficient funding for the regions. This ruling sees the regions as administrators of 
the central will, however this 'logic' is increasingly unrealistic. The regions, partly 
through the indifference of the center, are becoming increasingly autonomous. 
Therefore, as the financial needs of the regions increase, or the source of federal 
funding decreases, the regions will inevitably find some way of acquiring the 
needed cash. (ITAR-TASS, 21 Mar 97). 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Cathy Dreher and CDR John G. Steele 
 
53% of budget funding received 
The Russian Defense Ministry says it has received only about 53% of its 
budgeted funding in the first quarter of 1997. The funds that were received were 
used for wages, food, and fuel—no money was left for training or equipment 
maintenance. (RFE/RL Newsline, 23 Apr 97) 
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General Petr Deinekin, commander of the Russian Air Force, has suggested that 
the separate Russian services (Air Defense Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, 
and Military Space Forces) be unified under the Air Force. 
 
Comment 
In times of downsizing these proposals are fairly routine. Arguments in favor 
have to do with economies of scale and bureaucratic efficiency. Arguments 
against would cite the obvious attempt to increase the power and prestige of the 
"gaining" service. These reorganizations are often perceived as "zero-sum" 
games where the loss of one organization is necessarily the loss of another. The 
proposal is unlikely to go anywhere—particularly since the Strategic Rocket 
Forces are arguably in a far more powerful bureaucratic position, and are 
reportedly actually being paid on a regular basis—a sure sign of governmental 
favor in the Russia of today. 
 
Treaty support uneven 
The Chief of Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces, General Igor Sergeyev, publicly 
supported the START II accord (as yet unratified by the Duma), and called for a 
follow-on START III agreement. The Duma "postponed" ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention until autumn of 1997. (Monitor, 24 Apr 97) 
 
Comment 
It appears from press reports that the military and the Yel'tsin government 
support on-going arms control efforts, but the Duma is attempting to lever 
cooperation in this arena to influence NATO expansion and other initiatives. The 
Duma rhetoric concerning these topics has been reactionary, nationalistic and 
anti-West/U.S. It is small consolation that the Duma wields so little real day-to-
day power. Here, at least, they can dig in their heels and make it stick—it also 
provides a convenient excuse for governmental inaction. 
 
Russian military continues to decline 
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The general disrepair and turmoil within the ranks of the Russian military 
continue. The situation seems to be spiraling out of control with little hope of 
stopping. Russian troops are not being paid for months on end, foodstuffs are 
inadequate and they are starving. Officers are resigning because they have 
nowhere to live, no money and no food to feed their families. Simultaneously 
weapons are being stolen and sold on the black market and military facilities are 
falling into greater states of dilapidation, even some facilities which house 
chemical and nuclear weapons. Despite the terrible plight of Russia's military, 
however, elite forces are in better shape, her R & D expenditures continue and 
rates of crime and graft in the upper ranks of the military grow. (Sovetskaya 
rossiya, 15 Apr 97) 
 
Chemical weapons a critical problem 
In a 1993 convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, it became known 
that Russia had the largest arsenal in the world, some 40,000 agents. These 
arsenals of agents have been stockpiled for decades with documents attesting to 
their existence and testing as early as the 1930s. None of these weapons has 
been destroyed. Not only does Russia lack the facility to destroy them but, worse 
yet, the will to do so seems to be lacking. Sixty plus years of storing these 
chemical agents is too long for safety's sake and, given the deterioration of 
facilities in Russia, the prospect is terrifying. Washington D.C. is far too quiet on 
any of these issues and world-wide attention is certainly warranted. More and 
more, Russia begs the question "are we our brother's keeper?" If we want peace 
and safety in the world, the answer better be "yes, with offerings of gifts other 
than money." (NTV, 18 Apr 97). 
 
Community crime database created 
Interestingly enough the constantly escalating rate of crime in the former Soviet 
republics is forcing the special services to determine ways to work together. A 
joint crime data bank is being established with each of the participants—the 12 
services—receiving equal terms. A trial run is already showing its effectiveness. 
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The data bank comprises "open information" available to all participants as well 
as "operational information" which precludes third party access. What information 
is collected? Data on organized crime, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and 
nonproliferation of nuclear components. (Moskoviskiy komsomolets, 17 Apr 97). 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Mark Jones 
 
The rift widens  
Cracks continue to deepen in the foundation of the CIS. Ironically, those whose 
job it is to ensure cooperation are the very ones most responsible for the rift. Ivan 
Zayets, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council Commission of 
Foreign Affairs and Ties with the CIS, told reporters from Khreshchatyk on 12 
April that in his opinion, "Ukraine should secede from all the CIS structures in 
which it participates." He went on to say that his country was in essence not a 
member of the Commonwealth now, and claimed that "every new day and year 
proves than an organism like the [CIS] is useless and has no future." He 
attributed the organization's problems to the fundamental difference in 
interpretation of what the Commonwealth is supposed to be. In particular, 
according to Zayets, "Russia sees in this assembly a mechanism for 
reintegration, and a mechanism for reconstructing the Soviet Union, Ukraine 
regards the CIS as a mechanism for civilized separation." 
 
Zayets' Russian counterpart, Aman Tuleyev, is similarly unhappy with the state of 
CIS cooperation. In a 15 April interview in Selskaya Zhizn, Tuleyev blasted many 
member states for trying to form new alliances within the CIS, for looking "more 
actively to the west," and for pushing ahead with programs designed to increase 
independence from Russia. He reserved special mention for Ukraine, which he 
claims is pursuing an "anti-Russian policy." He went on to insist that Ukraine 
repay its $2.5 billion "debt" to Russia and asserted that Kiev is "literally bursting 
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to join NATO." More ominously, Tuleyev remarked that "if present generations of 
Russians and Ukrainians ... are unable to reunite today, the rising generation, 
educated from the new textbooks and brought up to consider Russia an enemy, 
will never unite." 
 
Additional evidence of the CIS split can be seen in the number of high-level 
meetings which don't include representatives from Moscow. On 22 April, Iprinda 
(Tbilisi) reported that Georgian President Shevardnadze and Kyrgyz President 
Akayev met and signed a total of 16 bilateral agreements. The accords dealt with 
economics, customs, transportation, investments, and one "On Friendship and 
Cooperation." Two days later, President Akayev signed 13 more documents on 
cooperation with his Azeri counterpart. Interfax (24 Apr 97) reports that many of 
the agreements dealt with oil production and refining, including one calling for 
Azerbaijan to supply one million tons of crude oil per year to a Kyrgyz refining 
plant. On April 28, Shevardnadze met with Ukrainian President Kuchma to 
discuss economic relations and cooperation. 
 
Yel'tsin agrees with Lukashenka's view on CIS integration 
Russian President Yel'tsin agreed with Belarusian President Lukashenka's idea 
that future CIS integration should be based on the Inter-State Council of Four 
treaty. At the same time, Yel'tsin suggested that at the next meeting of the 
council a decision should be made to "step up the integration of Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan." (Interfax, 20 Apr 97) 
 
Ukraine pushes for deported persons' rights 
Ukraine is pushing Russia, Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Moldova to ratify the 
October 1992 Bishkek agreements on the Rights of Deported Persons, National 
Minorities and Peoples. Ukraine is particularly interested in speedy ratification 
because it believes the accords will hasten the return of between 100,000 and 
200,000 Crimean Tartars expelled by Stalin. This influx of Tartars to the 
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peninsula is expected to weaken the pro-Moscow element currently dominating 
Sevastopol. (Interfax, 24 Apr 97) 
 
CIS air-defense integration 
Noting that Azerbaijan and Ukraine have not joined the Unified Air Defense 
System, and that Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine rely solely on bilateral 
cooperation with Russia for their air defense needs, a report in Nezavisimoye 
voyennoye obozreniye (12 Apr 97) claims that efforts are continuing to develop 
an integrated CIS air defense system. The article claims that unlike previous 
years, when Russia funded most of the air defense projects, in 1997 funding will 
be shared by "all Commonwealth states." 
 
In a related story, ITAR-TASS (17 Apr 97) reported that General of the Army 
Victor Prudnikov, commander-in-chief of Russian air defense troops, announced 
that the huge inter-state financial and industrial group, Granit, will appropriate 
some funds to help develop, construct, and train future commanders of a Unified 
Air Defense System. 
 
New peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia 
According to ITAR-TASS (21 Apr 97), the rotation of CIS peacekeeping forces in 
Abkhazia has been completed. The old units, one motorized rifle battalion and 
one airborne assault battalion, have been replaced with two reinforced motorized 
rifle battalions—one from the 589th Guard Berlin Regiment, the other from the 
433rd Red Banner Don Cossack Regiment. 
 
CIS border conference held 
The director of the Russian Federal Border Service attended a meeting in 
Dushanbe concerning the "protection of the CIS's southern border." According to 
ITAR-TASS (24 Apr 97), "[T]he FSB director will have a meeting with Tajikistan's 
president,...brief him on the [border] situation and on the Russian border troops' 
plans for strengthening it." So much for Tajik sovereignty. 
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Meetings and more meetings 
On 24 April, a meeting of the "CIS Special Service Heads" was held in Tbilisi. 
According to NTV, the meeting was attended by several chief intelligence 
officers, including the director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. The 
proceedings, however, were shrouded in secrecy. One day later in Minsk, 
staffers from the CIS "power" departments, secret services, justice ministries, 
customs committees, and border troops met to discuss law enforcement issues. 
According to ITAR-TASS, the group recommended the creation of a "unified data 
bank on tax-payers." 
 
China signs border agreement with four CIS members 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and China signed a border 
agreement on April 24 that calls for the reduction of troops stationed on the 
national boundaries, the creation of a 100-kilometer buffer zone, mutual 
inspections, and mutual notification of exercises or deployments in the border 
area. (ITAR-TASS) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Alexandra S. Y. Kim 
 
UKRAINE 
Black Sea Fleet talks resume but Russia puts on pressure 
Despite the official suspension of talks on 10 April, Russia and Ukraine held a 
joint naval exercise three days later. Some of these exercises have not been held 
since 1992. (Interfax, 15 Apr 97) No final agreement on dividing the assets of the 
fleet exists, despite the fact that Ukraine formally agreed in September 1993 to 
sell Russia a portion of its share of the fleet in order to offset part of Ukraine's 
energy debt. 
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Consequently, on 22 April, the negotiation process opened again and the 
delegations met to consider draft documents on the fleet's division and status. 
(Interfax, 22 Apr 97) However, the conflict continues over the summer Sea 
Breeze '97 exercise as Ukraine prepares to hold a joint naval exercise with 
NATO off the Crimean peninsula. This is part of Ukraine's "Partnership for 
Peace" program but Russia has been putting pressure on Ukraine to abandon 
the exercise. Several parliamentary deputies in Russia and Ukraine protested on 
26 April against the Sea Breeze exercise. They state it "would undoubtedly 
undermine efforts by Russia and Ukraine to strengthen good-neighborly 
relations." (Interfax, 26 Apr 97) The protest might have been triggered by the 
event that happened two days prior. On 23 April, Ukrainian Foreign Minister 
Udovenko met Belgium's Premier Dehaene to sign a general cooperation 
agreement, but at the meeting Belgium's Foreign Minster Dereike confirmed his 
support of Ukraine's policy of integration into European structures, namely EU 
and NATO. (Interfax, 24 Apr 97) 
 
Finally on 1 May, Ukrainian Defense Minster Kuzmuk visited the U.S. and met Lt. 
Gen. Sheehan, NATO's supreme allied commander. During Kuzmuk's official 
visit, they developed specific cooperation programs for the future. 
 
Eleven years since Chernobyl 
26 April was observed as the day of Chernobyl disaster in which, parliamentary 
chairman Oleksandr Moroz told a rally on the 11th anniversary, over 3 million 
people were affected by the accident and 74 districts of Ukraine were 
contaminated. Emergency Situations Minister Valeriy Kalchenko said the 
government plans to complete the evacuation of people from the radiation-
affected areas this year. On 22 April, Ukraine received the approval from the 
representatives of the G-7 countries to enhance the safety of the sarcophagus 
constructed over the destroyed fourth reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power 
plant. Also the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development approved a 
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ECU118 million grant to be used for the preparations for the closure of the plant. 
(Intelnews, 24 Apr 97) 
 
MOLDOVA 
Normalization memorandum to be signed 8 May 
The small breakthrough in the agreement for Moldova and the Dniester Republic 
has proven to be less of a political success for the countries' presidents who now 
face political opposition and criticism at home. They are accused of being 
compromisers, who acted as pawns under Russia and Ukraine because of their 
countries' large debts, i.e. energy debts. One opposing group in Dniester, the 
Party of Democratic Forces (PFDM), criticizes the "government's readiness to 
grant to Russia the controlling blocks of many large enterprises,...in exchange for 
clearing huge energy debts to Moscow. This is a grave strategic blunder which 
will influence negatively the political and economic independence..." (Infotag, 21 
Apr 97) 
 
On 19 April, the leaders of Moldova and the Dniester Republic reached 
agreement in Tiraspol to sign the memorandum in Moscow on 8 May. Although 
Moldovan President Lucinschi faces opposition from the Party of Democratic 
Forces (PFDM) and Dniester Republic's President Smirnov faces opposition from 
the local communist party, the radical leftists, and the Union of Dniester 
Defenders, both presidents firmly stated that they will sign the memorandum. On 
8 May the CIS commission, including members of parliament from Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia, as well as the 
OSCE delegation, will be at the signing. (ITAR-TASS, 5 May 97) 
 
President Lucinschi's first 100 days 
President Petru Lucinschi entered the election race with the slogan, "Stability, 
Order, and Welfare." 24 April was his 100th day in office, and the president has 
been active in trying to strengthen economic ties around its borders. However, in 
the first quarter the GDP has decreased 8 percent, and external debts are over 
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50 percent of GDP. Perhaps the future may be brighter as he reaps some reward 
from these recent meetings. On 22 April, Azerbaijan stated it will join the Ukraine-
Moldova-Georgia customs union, instead of the existing union between Belarus, 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. (Turan, 22 Apr 97) Also, on 30 April, during 
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation in Istanbul, there was a tripartite Moldovan-
Romanian-Ukrainian meeting to consider creating a free economic zone in two 
months. (Infotag, 30 Apr 97) 
 
BELARUS 
President Lukashenka makes eight-day Asian tour 
From 20-28 April, President Lukashenka visited South Korea, Vietnam and 
China. South Korean President Kim and Belarusian President Lukashenka 
signed a joint statement which emphasized the importance of regular 
consultations to encourage political and economic cooperation. (Interfax, 22 Apr 
97) President Kim shared his concerns about NATO enlargement, fearing 
another Cold War situation, and praised President Lukashenka's plan for a 
nuclear-free Europe. The two presidents signed a 10-year treaty on friendly 
relations and cooperation. (Interfax, 22 Apr 97) As a result of the meetings, 
Lukashenka declared on 2 May that Belarus will open an embassy in Seoul. 
(Belapan, 2 May 97) In China, Lukashenka announced that a business deal was 
made for over $200 million between China and Belarus. (Interfax, Apr 97) 
Lukashenka stated he supports China's stance on human rights, and "that states' 
opinions on human rights cannot bear a universal character." (BTK Television 
Network, 21 Apr 97). 
 
Draft union charter to be submitted to Supreme Council 
The draft charter of the Belarusian-Russian union will be submitted on 24-25 May 
for consideration and signing, stated Mikhail Khvastow, the Belarusian deputy 
foreign minister. He said the nationwide public debates over the charter will 
continue until mid-May. (Belapan, 2 May 97) 
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Hush-up of gas pipeline explosion 
On 30 April, there was an explosion in a section of the Torzhok-Minsk-
Ivatsevichy gas pipeline. (Specific details on location were not mentioned; no 
injuries were reported.) The incident is thought to be an act or terrorism, criminal 
negligence or technical accident. However, the explosion was not covered by the 
Belarusian media. In fact, the event was covered by the Russian media, which 
informed the Belarusian citizens of what had happened. The Belarusian state 
radio and television stations were told to keep the incident a secret. This is yet 
another example of Lukashenka's successful attempts to control Belarus' media, 
having already suppressed free radio and television stations and expelled or 
jailed all journalists who did not echo the official viewpoint. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
TURKMENISTAN 
State employees' and military salaries increased 
In a television broadcast on 4 February President Niyazov announced that state 
employees' and military personnel's salaries would be doubled as of 1 March 
1997. These salary increases are to be financed by fines for overdue gas 
payments which are to be levied on Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan 
(OMRI Daily Digest, 6 Feb 97). 
 
Turkmen statistics for 1996 economic growth released 
The statistics for Turkmenistan's 1996 economic performance were published on 
3 February in an Ashgabat newspaper. The inflation rate for 1996 was 100.1% 
and the country's GDP exceeded 6.6 trillion manats. The gas industry accounted 
for the largest share of GDP, at 30%. Over 90% of Turkmenistan's commercial 
goods were produced by state enterprises, but private manufacturers have 
begun to dominate the consumer goods market with a 66% share of retail trade 
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turnover. This is attributed to the government's privatization reforms (Ashgabat 
Turkmen Press, 3 Feb 97). 
 
President signs new oil, gas deals with Japanese and Dutch companies 
President Niyazov signed two new agreements with foreign companies to aid in 
the development of Turkmenistan's oil and gas resources. Under the terms of the 
first agreement, three Japanese companies (Itochu, JDC, and Nissho Iwai) will 
build a polypropylene plant in the town of Turkmenbashi, backed by $400 million 
in Japanese government funds (ITAR-TASS World Service, 18 Feb 97). The 
second agreement will allow the Dutch subsidiary of Israel's Bateman Company 
to invest $180 million in U.S. and South African funds to modernize 
Turkmenistan's pipeline system (OMRI Daily Digest, 19 Feb 97). 
 
Mobil and Monument to develop Turkmen oil and gas 
Mobil Exploration and Producing Turkmenistan, Inc. will team up with the UK-
based Monument Oil and Gas Company in a production-sharing agreement with 
the Turkmen government to explore and develop oil and gas resources in the 
Nebit-Dag license area. These companies have also been granted the exclusive 
right to negotiate a production-sharing agreement with regard to most of 
Turkmenistan's on-shore oil resources (OMRI Daily Digest, 18 Feb 97). 
 
Turkmenistan calls for early ECO summit to discuss pipelines 
Turkmenistan has requested that the next ECO (Economic Cooperation 
Organization, consisting of the five Central Asian states, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, 
Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey) summit to be held in Ashgabat be rescheduled from 
late 1998 to late 1997 instead. One of the main topics to be discussed at the next 
ECO meeting is the question of how to speed up pipeline construction (OMRI 
Daily Digest, 10 Feb 97). 
 
President Niyazov signs new cooperation agreements with Iran 
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President Niyazov concluded a two-day visit to Tehran on 13 Feb. During his 
stay he held talks with President Hashemi-Rafsanjani and with Majles 
(parliament) Speaker Nateq-Nuri. The Turkmen president signed a number of 
agreements, including one on increasing the amount of commercial goods 
transport along the railway which links the two countries (apparently other Asian 
and European countries have also expressed interest in having access to this 
railway link); and an agreement on the construction of the Pol-e Khatun Dam on 
the Harir Rud River. The two presidents also signed trilateral cooperation 
agreements with Ukraine and Armenia (IRNA, 13 Feb 97; IRIB Television First 
Program Network, 13 Feb 97). 
 
Turkmenistan, India, and Iran plan joint undertakings 
A trilateral economic commission meeting between Turkmenistan, India, and Iran 
took place in Tehran in late February to discuss plans for a number of joint 
enterprises. Plans were announced to ship gas from Turkmenistan to India and 
to build a shipping repair installation on the Iranian-Turkmen Caspian border. The 
three countries also agreed to grant Georgia a seat on the commission (the 
commission was established in 1995) (OMRI Daily Digest, 24 Feb 97). 
 
Turkmen government Press Committee abolished by decree 
On 12 February President Niyazov issued a decree abolishing the government 
Press Committee and replacing it with a new, state-run publishing house, 
Turkmenpechat', which will be directly subordinate to the Cabinet. The official 
reason for this change is that it will increase the efficiency and improve the 
quality of material published in Turkmenistan (Interfax, 12 Feb 97). 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
ARMENIA 
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Armenian parliament ratifies treaty on Russian base 
On 29 April the Armenian parliament ratified the treaty extending the legal 
framework of the Russian military base for 25 years. The treaty passed the 
Armenian parliament with 188 versus four votes with one abstention. The 
Russian Duma ratified the treaty on 18 April. In presenting the treaty to the 
Duma. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Pastukhov described Armenia as 
an important ally in the strategic Caucasus region and stressed that "Armenia 
supports Russia in its opposition to the NATO enlargement to the East." (Interfax, 
29 Apr 97) 
 
Draft of new Friendship and Cooperation Treaty nearly complete 
The existing friendship treaty between Armenia and Moscow was concluded in 
1991 but remains unratified in both countries. The head of the Russian 
delegation to the talks with Armenia, Vsevolod Oleandrov, stated that the new 
treaty needs to be finalized by the governments of both states before the signing 
can take place. Other economic accords are also in the works. (TASS, 23 Apr 
97) 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Former prime minister facing corruption charges 
Surat Husseinov, who fled Azerbaijan following a September 1994 coup attempt 
against president Geyder Aliev, was extradited from Russia last month, following 
the disclosures of Russian military assistance to Armenia. According to his 
lawyer, Husseinov is being accused of misappropriating state property (630 tons 
of wool). That the Azeri government is not pursuing charges of treason for his 
surrender of the Kelabadzhar region to the Armenian side in April 1993 or for his 
activities in connection with the September 1994 coup attempt, after Aliev and 
many other high-level officials have accused him of these crimes, is puzzling. 
One possible explanation is that indictment for the lesser crime of 
misappropriating government property may have been a condition of his 
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extradition from Moscow. It is unlikely that Aliev wishes to rehabilitate his 
opponent. (Interfax, 25 Apr 97) 
 
Azerbaijan access to Russian waterways still impeded 
On 14 March the restrictions on air, rail, and road communications between 
Russia and Azerbaijan were lifted—but the resumption of access to Russian 
waterways was omitted from Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's decision. 
These restrictions, which deeply undermined the Azeri economy, were imposed 
by the Russian government in December 1994 in connection with the war in 
Chechnya. Azerbaijan relies on the Volga-Don canal for much of its shipping, 
including the oil rigs needed to develop oil wells in the Caspian Sea. Azeri 
access to the waterways will be governed by a separate agreement. According to 
a source in the Russian embassy, the Russian side will try to use the waterways 
issue to pressure Azerbaijan to accept Russian border guards on its external 
frontiers. (Azadlyg, 17 Apr 97) 
 
GEORGIA 
Russian general refuses to enforce expanded CIS mandate 
On 29 April the Georgian president's press service announced that he would 
seek a replacement for the commander of the peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia 
due to the general's refusal to enforce the provisions of the new CIS mandate. 
The revised mandate expands the area of the peacekeeping activities with the 
aim of ensuring the safe return of ethnic Georgian refugees. (Iprinda, 29 Apr 97) 
General Dolya Bebenkov, the commander of Russian "peacekeeping" forces in 
Abkhazia, told journalists that the CIS resolution, which expands the mandate of 
his forces, will likely never be implemented, because the "Abkhaz and Georgian 
side have failed to reach accord on the issue." (Radio Tbilisi Network, 27 Apr 97) 
 
That the Russian military continues to resist efforts to repatriate refugees comes 
as no surprise given their history of supplying arms and weapons to the Abkhaz 
during the 1992-1993 war. Recently the Supreme Council of the Autonomous 
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Republic of Abkhazia, based in Tbilisi, responded to Russian Foreign Ministry 
denials of arms shipments and other support to the Abkhaz with a statement that 
contained the following list of arms and equipment: 
 
"We possess ample evidence that the Russian military have provided 
Abkhaz separatists with a large amount of arms and combat equipment. 
Even before the war began, Abkhaz separatists had received over 1,000 
automatic rifles, 267 handguns, 50 machine guns, and a large amount of 
ammunition from the 643rd Anti-Aircraft Regiment of the Russian Defense 
Ministry. Dolgopolov, battalion commander of the 345th Paratroop 
Regiment, handed over six armored vehicles, nine machine guns, and 357 
hand grenades to the separatists. The separatists received a large amount 
of weapons and combat equipment from the Russian military units Nos. 
75547, 10935, 5482, and 3687. In addition, during the fighting they 
received trainloads of ammunition, shells, tanks, cannons, and other 
military equipment." (Iprinda, 19 Apr 97) 
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